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The following historical survey, developed by means of excerpts from
the earliest American cases to the current statutes, reflects the great
contribution of American legal thought to the growth of genuine
freedom of conscience.

Privileged Communications
to Clergymen
New- York, Court of General Sessions,
The People,
On an indictment for revs.

Daniel Phillips and wife.

ceiving stolen goods.

[Sampson, The Catholic Question in Americat ( 1813)]

T

like many others of importance, had its origin in a trivial
occasion: One Philips,* together with his wife, was indicted for a
misdemeanor in receiving stolen goods, the property of James Cating.
The vigilant justices of the police discovered that after lodging his information before them he had received restitution, and thereupon had him
brought up and interrogated him with a view to further discovery. He
shewed so much unwillingness to answer, that suspicions fell upon him
and he was threatened with a commitment to bridewell. He was admonished that it was his duty on his oath to reveal the whole truth, and the
duty of magistrates to enquire into it, and to enforce obedience to the
law. He then mentioned that he had received the restitution of his effects
from the hands of his pastor, the Reverend Mr. Kohlmann, Rector of
Saint Peter's. Thereupon, a summons was issued to that gentleman to
appear at the police office, with which he instantly complied. But upon
being questioned touching the persons from whom he received the
restitution, he excused himself from making such disclosure, upon the
grounds that will be fully stated in the sequel. He was then asked some
questions of a less direct tendency, as to the sex or colour of the person
who delivered the goods into his hands, and answered in like manner.
Upon the case being sent to the Grand Jury he was subpoenaed to
attend before them, and appeared in obedience to the process, but, in
respectful terms, declined answering. Bills of indictment were found,
upon other testimony, against Charles Bradley and Benjamin Brinkerhoff, both coloured men, as principals, and against Philips and wife as
receivers....
HIS CASE,

l"Not officially reported, but set forth by the attorney who participated in the case
as amicus curiae, and later reprinted in I Western Law Journal 109 (1843).
The original records of the case are on display in the library of the Court of
General Sessions of the County of New York.
*The original spelling, puncttation and grammar has been followed even when
inconsistent or incorrect.
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Among the witnesses returned on the
back of the indictment was the Reverend
Anthony Kohlmann, who being called and
sworn, was asked some questions touching
the restitution of the goods. He in a very
becoming manner entreated that he might
be excused, and offered his reasons to the
Court, which are here omitted to avoid
repetition, but will be found at length in
the sequel.
Mr. George Wilson objected also on
behalf of his clients. The case was novel
and without precedent, and Mr. Sampson,
an amicus curiae, interposed, and observed
that in no country where he had been,
whether Protestant or Catholic, not even in
Ireland, where the Roman Catholic religion was under the ban of proscription, had
he ever heard of an instance where the
clergyman was called upon to reveal the
solemn and inviolable secrecy of sacramental confession, and with the ready
assent of Mr. Riker, obtained an adjournment of the trial until Counsel could be
heard in deliberate argument....
CLINTON, Mayor. In order to criminate
the defendants, the Reverend Anthony Kohlmann, a minister of the Roman catholic
church of this city, has been called upon
as a witness, to declare what he knows on
the subject of this prosecution. To this
question he has declined answering, and
has stated in the most respectful manner
the reasons which govern his conduct. That
all his knowledge respecting this investigation, is derived from his functions as a
minister of the Roman catholic church, in
the administration of penance, one of their
seven sacraments; and that he is bound by
the canons of his church, and by the obligations of his clerical office, to the most
inviolable secrecy - which he cannot infringe, without exposing himself to degra-
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dation from office - to the violation of his
own conscience, and to the contempt of
the catholic world.
In corroboration of this statement, a
book entitled "The Catholic Christian instructed in the sacraments, sacrifices, ceremonies, and observances of the church, by
the late right reverend R. Chalhoun, D.D."
has been quoted, which declares, "That by
the law of God and his church, whatever is
declared in confession, can never be discovered, directly or indirectly, to any one,
upon any account whatsoever, but remain
an eternal secret between God and the penitent soul - of which the confessor cannot,
even to save his own life, make any use at
all to the penitent's discredit, disadvantage,
or any other grievance whatsoever." Vide
Decretum Innocentie XI. die 18 November,
Anno. 1682 (page 120) and the same book
also says, that penance is a sacrament, and
consists, on the part of the penitent, of three
things, to wit - contrition, confession, and
satisfaction on the part of the minister in the
absolution pronounced by the authority of
Jesus Christ.
The question then is, whether a Roman
catholic priest shall be compelled to disclose what he has received in confession in violation of his conscience, of his clerical
engagements, and of the canons of his
church, and with a certainty of being
stripped of his sacred functions, and cut off
from religious communion and social intercourse with the denomination to which he
belongs.
This is an important enquiry; It is important to the church upon which it has a
particular bearing. It is important to all religious denominations, because it involves a
principle which may in its practical operation affect them all; we have therefore, devoted the few moments which we could
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spare, to an exposition of the reasons that
have governed our unanimous opinion: But
before we enter upon this investigation, we
think it but an act of justice to all concerned
in it, to state, that it has been managed with
fairness, candour, and a liberal spirit, and
that the counsel on both sides have displayed great learning and ability; and it is
due particularly to the public prosecutors,
to say, that neither in the initiation nor conducting of this prosecution, has there been
manifested the least disposition to trespass
upon the rights of conscience -and it is
equally due to the reverend Mr. Kohlmann
to mention, that the articles stolen, were delivered by him to the police, for the benefit
of the owners, in consequence of the efficacy
of his admonitions to the offenders, when
they would otherwise, in all probability,
have been retained, and that his conduct has
been marked by a laudable regard for the
laws of the country, and the duties of his
holy office.
It is a general rule, that every man when
legally called upon to testify as a witness,
must relate all he knows. This is essential
to the administration of civil and criminal
justice.
But to this rule there are several exceptions - a husband and wife cannot testify
against each other, except for personal aggressions - nor can an attorney or counsellor, be forced to reveal the communications of his client - nor is a man obliged to
answer any question, the answering of which
may oblige him to accuse himself of a crime,
or subject him to penalties or punishment.
In the case of Lord Melville, upon a witness declining to testify, lest he might render
himself liable to a civil action, the question
was referred to the twelve judges; and eight,
together with the lord high chancellor,
against four, were of opinion, that he was

bound to answer. To remove the doubt
which grew out of this collision, an act of
parliament was passed, declaring "that a
witness cannot by law, refuse to answer a
question relevant to the matter in issue, the
answering of which has no tendency to accuse himself, or to expose him to a penalty
or forfeiture of any nature whatever, by reason only, or on the sole ground that the
answering of such question, may establish
or tend to establish that he owes a debt, or is
otherwise subject to a civil suit, either at the
instance of his majesty or of any other person or persons." This statute has settled the
law in Great Britain. The point in this state
may be considered as res non adjudicata but I have little doubt that when determined, the exemption from answering of a
witness so circumstanced will be established.
Whether a witness is bound to answer a
question, which may disgrace or degrade
him, or stigmatize him by the acknowledgment of offences, which have been pardoned
or punished, or by the confession of sins or
vices, which may affect the purity of his
character, and the respectability of his
standing in society, without rendering him
obnoxious to punishment, is a question involved in much obscurity, and about which
there is a variety of doctrine, and a collision
of adjudications.
After carefully examining this subject,
we are of opinion that such a witness ought
not to be compelled to answer. The benevolent and just principles of the common law,
guard with the most scrupulous circumspection, against temptations to perjury,
and against a violation of moral feeling;
and what greater inducement can there be
for the perpetration of this offence, than
placing a man between Scylla and Charybdis, and in such an awful dilemma that he
must either violate his oath, or proclaim his
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infamy in the face of day, and in the presence of a scoffing multitude? And is there
not something due to the feelings of human
nature, which revolt with horror at an
avowal that must exclude the witness from
the pale of decent society, and subject him
to that degradation which is as frequently
the cause as the consequence of crimes?
One of the earliest cases we meet with on
this subject is that of Cooke (4 St. Tr. 748.
Salkreld, 153-) who being indicted for
treason, in order to found a challenge for
cause, asked a juror whether he had not
said he believed him guilty. The whole
Court determined he was not obliged to
answer the question - and Lord Chief Justice Treby said, "Men have been asked
whether they have been convicted and pardoned for felony, or whether they have been
whipped for petit larceny, and they have
not been obliged to answer: for though their
answer in the affirmative will not make them
criminal nor subject to punishment, yet they
are matters of infamy, and if it be an infamous thing, that's enough to preserve a
man from being bound to answer. A pardoned man is not guilty; his crime is purged;
but merely for the reproach of it, it shall not
be put upon him to answer a question
whereupon he will be forced to forswear or
disgrace him."
In the case of Rex vs. Lewis and others
(4 Espinasses nisi prius cases, 225) the
witness was asked if he had not been in the
house of correction, in Sussex. Lord Ellenborough, relying upon the opinion just
quoted, declared, that a witness was not
bound to answer any question, the object
of which was to degrade or render him infamous. In the case of MacBride vs. MacBride (same book 243) Lord Alvanly, on
a witness being asked whether she lived in
a state of concubinage with the 'plaintiff,
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overruled the question, saying, that he
thought questions as to general conduct,
might be asked, but not such as went immediately to degrade the witness, and concluded by saying, "I think those questions
only should not be asked, which have a direct and immediate effect to disgrace, or
disparage the witness."
In the supreme court of New-Jersey
(Pennington's Reports, the State, vs. Bailey,
415) the following question was proposed
to a witness. Have you been convicted of
petit larceny and punished? The Court after
argument decided, that a witness could be
asked no question, which in its answer
might tend to disgrace or dishonor him, and
therefore, in the particular case the witness
was not bound to answer the question.
In the case of Bell, an insolvent debtor,
which occurred in the Court of Common
Pleas, for the first Judicial District of Pennsylvania (Browne's Reports, 376) a question was asked the father of the insolvent,
which went to impeach and invalidate a
judgement he had against the insolvent,
which question the Court overruled. Rush,
the President, saying, "I have always overruled a question that would affect a witness
civilly, or subject him to a criminal prosecution; I have gone farther, and where the
answer to a question would cover the witness with infamy or shame, I have refused
to compel him to answer it."
In the case of Jackson ex dem Wyckoff.
vs. Humphrey (1 Johnson's Reports 498)
a deed was attempted to be invalidated at
the circuit, by the testimony of the judge,
taking the proof on the ground that the
proof it was taken in Canada, and also, that
the subscribing witness could not have
known the facts respecting the identity of
the grantor, as testified by him before the
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judge who took the proof, and also to impeach the general character of the witness.
The testimony was overruled by the judge,
and a verdict found for the plaintiff, and a
motion for a new trial prevailed. The Court
declaring, that "The judge, before whom the
proof of the deed was made, was a competent witness to prove that it was done in
Canada, and if that fact be established, the
proof was illegal and void. Though the judge
was a competent witness, he would not have
been bound to answer any questions impeaching the integrity of his conduct as a
public officer," and we believe it to be the
general if not established practice of our
Courts to excuse a witness from answering
questions which relate to sexual intercourse,
in actions brought for a breach of promise
of marriage, or by parents for seduction.
We have gone more particularly into this
branch of the subject, because it has a very
intimate connexion with the point in question. None of these propositions - that a
witness is not obliged to confess a crime, or
subject himself to a penalty, or to impair or
injure his civil rights by his testimony - or
to proclaim his turpitude or immorality, can
be considered as including within its purview, the precise case before us. They all,
however, touch upon it, in a greater or less
degree. With the exception of the second
position, there is this strong difference, they
are retrospective and refer to past conduct,
whereas in the case now pending, if we
decide that the witness shall testify, we prescribe a course of conduct by which he will
violate his spiritual duties, subject himself
to temporal loss, and perpetrate a deed of
infamy. If he commits an offence against religion; if he is deprived of his office and of
his bread, and thrown forlorn and naked
upon the wide world, an object for the hand
of scorn, to point its slow and moving finger

at, we must consider that this cannot be done
without our participation and coercion.
There can be no doubt but that the witness does consider, that his answering on
this occasion, would be such a high handed
offence against religion, that it would expose him to punishment in a future state and it must be conceded by all, that it would
subject him to privations and disgrace in
this world. It is true, that he would not be
obnoxious to criminal punishment, but the
reason why he is excused where he would be
liable to such punishment, applies with
greater force to this case, where his sufferings would be aggravated by the compunctious visitings of a wounded conscience,
and the gloomy perspective of a dreadful hereafter; although he would not lose
an estate, or compromit a civil right, yet he
would be deprived of his only means of
support and subsistence - and although he
would not confess a crime, or acknowledge
his infamy, yet he would act an offence
against high heaven, and seal his disgrace
in the presence of his assembled friends, and
to the affliction of a bereaved church and a
weeping congregation.
It cannot therefore, for a moment be believed, that the mild and just principles of
the common Law would place the witness in
such a dreadful predicament; in such a horrible dilemma, between perjury and false
swearing: If he tells the truth he violates his
ecclesiastical oath - If he prevaricates he
violates his judicial oath - Whether he lies,
or whether he testiffes the truth he is wicked,
and it is impossible for him to act without
acting against the laws of rectitude and the
light of conscience.
The only course is, for the court to declare that he shall not testify or act at all.
And a court prescribing a different course
must be governed by feelings and views very
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different from those which enter into the
composition of a just and enlightened tribunal, that looks with a propitious eye upon
the religious feelings of mankind, and which
dispenses with an equal hand the universal
and immutable elements of justice.
There are no express adjudications in the
British courts applied to similar or analogous cases, which contradict the inferences
to be drawn from the general- principles
which have been discussed and established
in the course of this investigation: Two only
have been pointed out as in any respect
analogous, which we shall now proceed to
consider.
In the case of Du Barre &c. (Peake's
cases at nisi prius 77) the following question was agitated, whether as the Defendant
was a Frenchman who did not understand
the English language and his attorney not
understanding French was obliged to communicate with him by an interpreter, the
interpreter ought to be permitted to give
evidence, the Defendant's Counsel contending that this was a confidence which ought
not to be broken, Lord Kenyon decided that
the interpreter should only reveal such conversation as he had with the Defendant in
the absence of the attorney. Garrow for the
Plaintiff, said that a case much stronger than
this had been lately determined by Mr.
Justice Buller, on the Northern Circuit. That
was a case in which the life of the prisoner
was at stake. The name of it was, The King,
vs. Sparkes. There the prisoner being a
Papist had made a confession before a
Protestant Clergyman of the crime, for
which he was indicted and that confession
was permitted to be given in evidence on the
trial, and he was convicted and executed.
Lord Kenyon upon this remarked, "I should
have paused before I admitted the evidence
here admitted."

The case referred to by Garrow, is liable
to several criticisms and objections. In the
first place it was stated by a Counsel in the
cause, and is therefore liable to those errors
and perversions which grow out of that situation. Secondly, it is the determination of a
single Judge, in the hurry of a circuit, when
a decision must be made promptly, without
time for deliberation, or consultation, and
without an opportunity for recurrence to
books. Thirdly, it is virtually overturned by
Lord Kenyon, who certainly censures it with
as much explicitness as one Judge can impeach the decision of his colleague, without
departing from judicial decorum. Fourthly,
the depositary of the secret was a Protestant
Clergyman, who did not receive it under the
seal of a sacrament, and under religious
obligations of secrecy, and would not, therefore, be exposed to ecclesiastical degradation and universal obloquy by promulgating
it. - And lastly, the decision of Mr. Justice
Buller, was, to say the least, erroneous; for
when a man under the agonies of an afflicted
conscience and the disquietudes of a perturbed mind, applies to a minister of the
Almighty, lays bare his bosom filled with
guilt, and opens his heart black with crime,
and solicits from him advice and consolation, in this hour of penitence and remorse,
and when this confession and disclosure may
be followed by the most salutary effects upon
the religious principles and future conduct
of the penitent, and may open to him prospects which may bless the remnant of his
life, with the soul's calm sunshine and the
heart-felt joy, without interfering with the
interests of society, surely the establishment
of a rule throwing all these pleasing prospects into shade, and prostrating the relation between the penitent and the comforter,
between the votary and the minister of religion, must be pronounced a heresy in our
legal code.
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The other case was decided by Sir
Michael Smith, Master of the Rolls of Ireland. On the 24th February, 1802, (2
M'Nally, 153) a bill was filed praying to be
decreed the estates of the late Lord Dunboyne, by the heir at law, who alleged that
the will, under which the Defendant claimed,
was a nullity, as Lord Dunboyne having
been a Popish Priest, and having conformed
and relapsed to Popery, had no power to
make a will. Issue was joined, and the Plaintiff produced the Reverend Mr. Gahan, a
Clergyman of the church of Rome, to be
examined, and interrogatories to the following effect, were among others, exhibited to
him: "What Religion did the late Lord Dunboyne profess from the year 1783 to the
year 1792? What Religion did he profess at
the time of his death, and a short time before his death?" The witness answered to
the first part, viz. that "Lord Dunboyne professed the Protestant religion during the
time, &c. but demurred to the latter part in
this way, "That his knowledge of the matter
enquired of (if any he had) arose from a
confidential communication to him, in the
exercise of his clerical functions, and which
the principles of his religion forbid him to
disclose, nor was he bound by the laws of
the land to answer."
The Master of the Rolls determined
against the demurrer; the reasons he assigns
are loose and general, and very unsatisfactory, and the only authority cited by him in
support of his decision, was that of Vaillant
vs. Dodermead, reported in 2 Atkyns 524,
which I shall now consider with a view of
showing that there is no point of resemblance or analogy between that and the
adjudication of the Master of the Rolls.
The Defendant in this case having examined Mr. Bristow, his Clerk in the Court,
the Plaintiff exhibited interrogatories for

cross-examining him, to which he demurred,
for that he knew nothing of the several
matters enquired of in the interrogatories,
besides what came to his knowledge as
clerk in court, or agent for the Defendant
in relation to the matters in question in this
cause. The Lord High Chancellor overruled
the demurrer, and compelled him to answer
for the following irresistible reasons. Because the matters enquired of were antecedent transactions to the commencement
of the suit, the knowledge whereof, could
not come to Bristow as clerk in court, or
solicitor: because this was a cross-examination, and whenever a party calls upon his
own attorney to testify, the other side may
examine him: and because he states that he
knew nothing but as clerk or agent. Now
the word agent includes non-privileged as
well as privileged persons. The only privileged persons are Counsellors, Solicitors
and Attorneys; an agent may be a Steward
or Servant.
What analogy can be traced between the
cases? Did the Catholic Priest cloak himself
under any generality or indefiniteness, of
expression? Did he obtain any information
from Lord Dunboyne previous to his acting
as his confessor, or in any other capacity
than as confessor? Was he called upon by
the Defendant to testify, and in consequence
thereof exposed to the cross-examination of
the Plaintiff? Surely not. The case then relied upon, does in no respect, in no similitude
of principle or resemblance of fact quadrate
with the case adjudicated, or in any degree,
or to any extent support it.
With those who have turned their attention to the history of Ireland, the decisions
of Irish courts, respecting Roman Catholics,
can have little or no weight.
That unfortunate country has been divided into two great parties, the oppressors
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and oppressed. The Catholic has been disfranchised of his civil rights, deprived of
his inheritance, and excluded from the common rights of man; statute has been passed
upon statute, and adjudication has been
piled upon adjudication in prejudice of his
religious freedom. The benign spirit of toleration, and the maxims of an enlightened
policy, have recently ameliorated his condition, and will undoubtedly, in process of
time, place him on the same footing with
his Protestant brethren; but until he stands
upon the broad pedestal of equal rights,
emancipated from the most unjust thraldom,
we cannot but look with a jealous eye upon
all decisions which fetter him or rivet his
chains.
But there is a very marked distinction
between that case, and the case now Linder
consideration. The Reverend Mr. Gahan
did not pretend that he derived his information from Lord Dunboyne, in the way of a
sacrament, but only as a confidential communication: he would not therefore be
exposed by a promulgation, to degradation,
breach of oaths, and a violation of his clerical duties. But the only imputation would
be on his personal honor as a gentleman.
Penance implies contrition for a sin,
confession of a sin, and satisfaction or reformation for a sin. Now can conversion to
the church of Rome, in the eye of a Roman
Catholic Layman, or a Roman Catholic
Priest, require contrition, or confession, or
reformation? And if it does not, a declaration of such conversion cannot be the sacrament of penance. In Gahan's case there
was no sacrament, or religious obligation of
secrecy. In the case of Mr. Kohlmann there
is the strongest that religion can impose,
involving every thing sacred in this world
and precious in that to come.

LAWYER

But this is a great constitutional question,
which must not be solely decided by the
maxims of the common law, but by th principles of our government: We have considered it in a restricted shape, let us now
look at it upon more elevated ground; upon
the ground of the constitution, of the social
compact, and of civil and religious liberty.
Religion is an affair between God and
man, and not between man and man. The
laws which regulate it must emanate from
the Supreme Being, not from human institutions. Established religions, deriving their
authority from man, oppressing other denominations, prescribing creeds of orthodoxy, and punishing non-conformity, are
repugnant to the first principles of civil and
political liberty, and in direct collision with
the divine spirit of christianity. Although
no human legislator has a right to meddle
with religion, yet the history of the world,
is a history of oppression and tyranny over
the consciences of men. And the sages who
formed our constitution, with this instructive
lesson before their eyes, perceived the indispensable necessity of applying a preventitive, that would forever exclude the introduction of calamities, that have deluged the
world with tears and with blood, and the
following section was accordingly engrafted
in our state constitution:
"And whereas we are required by the
benevolent principles of rational liberty, not
only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard
against that spiritual oppression and intolerance, wherewith the bigotry and ambition of
weak and wicked princes* have scourged
mankind, This convention doth further in
"The constitutional provision is incomplete as set

forth herein and should read: "wherewith the
bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked
priests and princes .... ." N. Y. Const., Art.
XXXVIlI (1777) (emphasis supplied). - Ed.
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the name, and by the authority of the good
people of this state, ordain, determine, and
declare, that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever
hereafter be allowed within this state, to all
mankind. Provided, that the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of this state."
Considering that we had just emerged
from a colonial state, and were infected with
the narrow views and bigotted feelings,
which prevailed at that time so strongly
against the Roman Catholics, that a priest
was liable to the punishment of death if he
came into the colony, this declaration of
religious freedom, is a wonderful monument
of the wisdom, liberality, and philanthropy
of its authors. Next to William Penn, the
framers of our constitution were the first
legislators who had just views of the nature
of religious liberty, and who established it
upon the broad and imperishable basis of
justice, truth, and charity: While we are
compelled to remark that this excellent provision was adopted by a majority of one, it
is but proper to say, that the colonial statute
against Roman Catholic Priests, originated
more from political than religious considerations. The influence which the French had
over the six nations, the Iroquois, and which
was exercised to the great detriment of the
British colonies, was ascribed to the arts and
management of the Jesuits, and it was therefore, in violation of all respect for the rights
of conscience, deemed of essential importance to interpose the penalty of death
against their migration into the colony.
A provision conceived in a spirit of the
most profound wisdom, and the most exalted charity, ought to receive the most

liberal construction. Although by the constitution of the United States, the powers of
congress do not extend beyond certain
enumerated objects; yet to prevent the danger of constructive assumptions, the following amendment was adopted: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." In this country there is
no alliance between church and state; no
established religion; no tolerated religion for toleration results from establishment but religious freedom guaranteed by the
constitution, and consecrated by the social
compact.
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances should be administered - that its ceremonies as well as its
essentials should be protected. The sacraments of a religion are its most important
elements. We have but two in the Protestant
Church - Baptism and the Lord's Supper -

and they are considered the seals of the
covenant of grace. Suppose that a decision
of this court, or a law of the state should
prevent the administration of one or both
of these sacraments, would not the constitution be violated, and the freedom of religion
be infringed? Every man who hears me will
answer in the affirmative. Will not the same
result follow, if we deprive the Roman
catholic of one of his ordinances? Secrecy is
of the essence of penance. The sinner will
not confess, nor will the priest receive his
confession, if the veil of secrecy is removed:
To decide that the minister shall promulgate
what he receives in confession, is to declare
that there shall be no penance; and this important branch of the Roman catholic religion would be thus annihilated.
It has been contended that the provision
of the constitution which speaks of practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
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state, excludes this case from the protection
of the constitution, and authorizes the interference of this tribunal to coerce the witness. In order to sustain this position, it
must be clearly made out that the concealment observed in the sacrament of penance,
is a practice inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the state.
The Roman catholic religion has existed
from an early period of christianity - at
one time it embraced almost all Christendom, and it now covers the greater part.
The objections which have been made to
penance, have been theological, not political. The apprehensions which have been
entertained of this religion, have reference
to the supremacy, and dispensing power,
attributed to the bishop of Rome, as head
of the catholic church - but we are yet to
learn, that the confession of sins has ever
been considered as of pernicious tendency,
in any other respect than it being a theological error - or its having been sometimes in
the hands of bad men, perverted to the purposes of peculation, an abuse inseparable
from all human agencies.
The doctrine contended for, by putting
hypothetical cases, in which the concealment
of a crime communicated in penance, might
have a pernicious effect, is founded on false
reasoning, if not on false assumptions: To
attempt to establish a general rule, or to
lay down a general proposition from accidential circumstances, which occur but
rarely, or from extreme cases, which may
sometimes happen in the infinite variety of
human actions, is totally repugnant to the
rules of logic and the maxims of law. The
question is not, whether penance may sometimes communicate the existence of an offence to a priest, which he is bound by his
religion to conceal, and the concealment of
which, may be a public injury, but whether

the natural tendency of it is to produce
practices inconsistent with the public safety
or tranquillity. There is in fact, no secret
known to the priest, which would be communicated otherwise, than by confession and no evil results from this communication - on the contrary, it may be made the
instrument of great good. The sinner may
be admonished and converted from the evil
of his ways: Whereas if his offence was
locked up in his own bosom, there would
be no friendly voice to recall him from his
sins, and no paternal hand to point out to
him the road to virtue.
The language of the constitution is emphatic and striking, it speaks of acts of
licentiousness, of practices inconsistent
with the tranquillity and safety of the state;
it has reference to something actually, not
negatively injurious. To acts committed, not
to acts omitted - offences of a deep dye,
and of an extensively injurious nature: It
would be stretching it on the rack so [to]
say, that it can possibly contemplate the forbearance of a Roman catholic priest, to testify what he has received in confession, or
that it could ever consider the safety of the
community involved in this question. To
assert this as the genuine meaning of the
constitution, would be to mock the understanding, and to render the liberty of conscience a mere illusion. It would be to destroy the enacting clause of the proviso and to render the exception broader than
the rule, to subvert all the principles of
sound reasoning, and overthrow all the
convictions of common sense.
If a religious sect should rise up and violate the decencies of life, by practicing their
religious rites, in a state of nakedness; by
following incest, and a community of wives.
If the Hindoo should attempt to introduce
the burning of widows on the funeral piles
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of their deceased husbands, or the Mahometan his plurality of wives, or the Pagan his
bacchanalian orgies or human sacrifices. If
a fanatical sect should spring up, as formerly in the city of Munster, and pull up
the pillars of society, or if any attempt
should be made to establish the inquisition, then the licentious acts and dangerous practices, contemplated by the constitution, would exist, and the hand of the
magistrate would be rightfully raised to
chastise the guilty agents.
But until men under pretence of religion,
act counter to the fundamental principles
of morality, and endanger the well being of
the state, they are to be protected in the
free exercise of their religion. If they are in
error, or if they are wicked, they are to answer to the Supreme Being, not to the unhallowed intrusion of frail fallible mortals.
We speak of this question, not in a theological sense, but in its legal and constitutional bearings. Although we differ from the
witness and his brethren, in our religious
creed, yet we have no reason to question
the purity of their motives, or to impeach
their good conduct as citizens. They are protected by the laws and constitution of this
country, in the full and free exercise of their
religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize the application of insult
to their faith, or of torture to their consciences.
There being no evidence against the Defendants, they were acquitted.
Hoffman (Recorder), Douglass and Cunningham (Aldermen), concur.
Both the Mayor and the Recorder
were members of the Court trying Daniel
and Mary Phillips although Chapter 10
of the Laws of 1787, required that only

one of them need be present. The reporter
noted that this unusual procedure was
followed "on account of the importance
of the case."
The next reported case in New York
(1817) involved a protestant clergyman
who was permitted to testify, over objection by the defendant's counsel, to a confession made to him as a minister of the
gospel.
New York, Court of Oyer and Terminer,
and Gaol Delivery,'
The People
VS.
Christian Smith

)

On an indictment for
murder-manslaughter.

[2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y.
1817)]
Though confessions made in confidence to a
divine of the Roman Catholic order, whose
duty it is to receive auricular confessions
according to the canons of that church, will
not be received in evidence, yet, admissions
made by a prisoner to a divine of the protestant churches, will be received.
Countrymen, this case contains for you,
much useful instruction. Here you may learn
the awful consequence of harbouring, for a
long period, a settled malignity against a
neighbour: you may profit by the example
afforded by the two wretched men, the subjects of the following case, whose private
feuds were so destructive, so deadly, as to
produce the melancholy castastrophe about
to be unfolded. .

..

It is your duty -God commands, and
your own happiness requires, that you
should cultivate peace, and friendship, and
brotherly love, and exercise, among each
The crowd of people was so great, that the court
was adjourned for the trial to the church.
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other, all the social and lovely charities of
life. By so doing, you may render each
hamlet delightful- each village a paradise.
The prisoner was indicted for the murder
of Bornt Lake, on Sunday, the 27th day of
October last, by firing and discharging at
the said Lake, a certain musket, loaded with
shot, by means of which, he, the said Bornt
Lake, instantly died.
Lester opened the cause to the jury, on
behalf of the prosecution, stating, that he
expected to prove in the course of the trial,
that the deceased and the prisoner, being
neighbours, certain unhappy differences subsisted between them, for sixteen years; and,
that previous to the day laid in the indictment, the prisoner had expressed his hostility towards the deceased, and threatened
revenge.
On the morning of the 27th of October
last, the deceased was found dead in the
public highway, near the land of the prisoner. A rammer and clasp belonging to a
musket were found near him, and his back
was pierced by a great number of wounds,
proceeding from gun shot. On searching the
house of the prisoner two muskets were
found, one of which was found concealed
in the rafters of the garret, without a rammer
and clasp; and those found, exactly fitted
the musket. The counsel concluded by stating, that he expected to prove this to be a
case of the most diabolical malice, which
had ever disgraced the records of our criminal courts.
Daniel Lake, a witness on behalf of the
prosecution, stated, that before the deceased
was killed, and during the same month, he,
the witness, had a conversation with the
prisoner on the subject of certain lawsuits
and other differences between the deceased
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and the prisoner, and offered himself as a
mediator; but the prisoner alleged that this
would be of no use, as an unsuccessful
attempt of that nature, had once before been
made: that the prisoner still continued to
trespass upon him; and that he, the prisoner,
could not bear with the night-walking of
the deceased, and intended to fix him. The
witness stated, that the deceased and the
prisoner had been at variance a number of
years, and the dispute extended to their
respective families.
On his cross-examination, the witness
stated, that the prisoner complained of
divers trespasses committed by the deceased,
to vex and injure; and, among other things,
that he had frequently let the swine of the
prisoner out of his pen at night, and taken
them up, under the town law, and had recovered the penalty, on the ground that the
prisoner suffered the swine to run at large.
The Rev. Peter J. Van Pelt, was here
called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, to prove certain confessions made
by the prisoner to him while confined in the
prison in this village.
Price inquired of the witness whether the
confessions spoken of were made by the
prisoner to the witness while he was visiting
him as a minister of the gospel? The witness
replied, that he had heard nothing from the
prisoner but what he believed to have been
communicated to him as a minister of the
gospel.
Mr. Price then objected to the testimony
of the witness. He said he was not aware
of any express decision in support of the
objection, but that he thought it dangerous
in the extreme to permit a witness, in the
relation of the one offered, to divulge a
communication which must, undoubtedly,
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have been made, and ought to have been
received, in the strictest confidence. It had
been decided by De Witt Clinton, while
mayor of the city of New-York, that auricular confessions, made in the confidence of
church discipline, were inadmissible evidence against a prisoner.2 He saw no distinction between that and the present case.
There was no good reason for restricting
such rule to any particular sect or denomination. It had no relation to the character
of the person in whom confidence is placed;
and whether made to a minister of the
The case to which the counsel alludes was of this
nature: A man belonging to the Roman Catholic
denomination, was brought to trial in the Court of
Sessions, in New-York, for grand larceny. On the
trial, Mr. Coleman, a priest of that denomination,
who, it appears, had previously restored to the
owner the property laid in the indictment, having
derived the information which led to a discovery
of the goods by means of a confession made to
him by one of the members of his church, was
called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
to prove that the prisoner had confessed to him
the felony.
By the established canons, or ordinances of that
church, confessions are to be made by the members, at least once a year, to the priest, in private;
and from the examination of Mr. Coleman, it
appeared that no other confessions were made to
him by the prisoner, in relation to this affair,
except those made in the ordinary course of church
discipline. According to the rules and ordinances
of the church, the priest is forbidden to divulge
these confessions; and the witness declared that no
consideration whatsoever, not even the most severe
punishment, would induce him to depart from the
established ordinances of the church.
On an objection raised by the prisoner's counsel
to this evidence, it was decided by his honour
De Witt Clinton, then Mayor of New-York, that
although confessions made to a Roman Catholic
priest were received in England, and no privilege
could be claimed by a priest of that order in
English courts, yet, his honour considered that,
in this country, we were at liberty to establish a
different rule. His honour decided in favour of
the privilege claimed, and that the testimony of
Mr. Coleman could not be required.

gospel, or a counsellor at law, is perfectly
immaterial. It arises, altogether, from the
presumption, that a prisoner, for his temporal or eternal safety, considers himself
compelled to make the confession. In this
view, it is not to be regarded as voluntary,
and, therefore, is inadmissible.
His honour the Judge then asked the
witness if he had any objection to state the
communication made by the prisoner? The
witness answered, that he had not.
His Honour thereupon decided that the
testimony was admissible, and took distinction between auricular confessions made to
a priest in the course of discipline, according to the canons of the church, and those
made to a minister of the gospel in confidence, merely as a friend or adviser.
The witness, on being sworn, testified,
that shortly after the prisoner had been
committed to prison, and since, he sent for
the witness, and professed to relate to him all
the circumstances of his case. The witness
visited the prisoner, and had several conversations with him, with a view of exhorting him to penitence and preparation
for his great trial hereafter. The account
which the prisoner gave of the unhappy
transaction is, in substance, as follows:
The deceased and himself had frequently
disputed and quarrelled, and the mind of
the prisoner, by reason thereof, became
harassed and disturbed. On the night preceding the affair, the prisoner was restless,
and remained awake much during the night.
About daylight, hearing a noise like the
shaking of a tree on his land, he went to
the door, and heard the noise more distinct.
He went out, and ascertained with certainty,
that there was somebody at the blackwalnut tree. This induced him to take his
gun and go to the tree. When he came up,
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it being still dusky, he saw a man under the
tree, on his knee, picking up black walnuts
in a basket. Approaching, the prisoner accosted the other, by saying, "I have caught
you at last." By this time he found that the
man was the deceased, who made no answer,
but crept or crawled away with his basket
containing the nuts, through the fence between the land of the prisoner and that of
Burbank. The deceased went along on one
side of the fence, and the prisoner on the
other, into the main road: the prisoner,
following the deceased, saying, "Deliver up
the nuts, and give up yourself like a man."
The deceased made off very fast towards his
own house, and the prisoner followed him,
demanding his nuts, which the other refused
to deliver. The prisoner, thereupon, made
towards the deceased, resolutely, to get his
nuts, but not to do any mischief to the
deceased. Whereupon the deceased seized
the muzzle of the gun, when, fearing that he
would wrest it away, the prisoner cried out
for help to his family, repeating this: "Will
none of you, or, is there nobody to help
me?" In the struggle, by a sudden and strong
jerk, the deceased drew the band and the
rammer from the musket, by reason of
which, the deceased and the prisoner were
separated. The deceased was going off,
hastily, with the band and rammer -the
prisoner followed, and being angry and bewildered, he discharged the gun; but whether
he took aim at the deceased, or not, the
prisoner did not know.
The witness asked the prisoner whether
hc saw the deceased fall, to which the prisoner answered no; but that he heard the
deceased, as he fell, cry out, "Lord have
mercy on me!"The prisoner told the witness, that when
the gun was fired, he, the prisoner, was but
a short distance from the deceased, and did
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not distinctly see him. That the deceased was
a stronger man than the prisoner, and the
witness himself is of that opinion. The prisoner did not state to the witness, that at the
time the scuffle ensued, the deceased threatened the prisoner with any bodily injury.
In assigning the reason why the deceased
came on his premises, the prisoner said he
supposed the deceased intended to steal and
carry away his property. The prisoner
showed much contrition at having killed the
deceased....
The jury were out 7 hours, and on their
return pronounced a verdict of "Not guilty."
Whereupon his honour Judge Van Ness,
addressed the prisoner in substance as
follows:
"Christian Smith, you have been tried and
acquitted by a jury of your country, for
having taken away the life of one of your
fellow creatures. I mean not to censure the
jury who acquitted you - it is not my province so to do, I hope they will be able, upon
future consideration, to reconcile their verdict to their consciences. But I should feel
myself wanting in my duty as a man, if I
did not express my opinion that, notwithstanding their verdict, I consider you a guilty
- very guilty man. Upon an ancient grudge,
you considered yourself justified in doing
what you have done; and the jury have, I
fear, confirmed your false and fatal judgment. But, beware - you have not yet
escaped. Believe me, youi most awful trial
is yet to come. You are now an old man,
and your days must be few in this world,
and you will shortly be compelled to appear
before another court, where there is no jury
but God himself - Unless you repent, and
devote your future life to an humble atonement of your guilt, your condemnation there
is certain. I am thus plain with you, in order
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that those who have listened to your trial,
may learn that whatever may be considered
to be the law of Staten Island, your conduct
is unjustifiable in the sight of God and man."
As a result of the Smith case, 3 the Legislature of 1828 enlarged the holding of the
Phillips case by enacting the following
statute:
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any
denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed
to disclose any confessions made to him in
his professional character, in the course of
discipline enjoined by the rules or practice
of such denomination. (N.Y. Rev. Stat.
1828, Pt. 3, c. 7, tit. 3, §72).

At present, statutory protection of the
disclosures made to a clergyman is provided
by Section 351 of the New York Civil Practice Act which is substantially the same as
4
the original statute.
Thirty states have statutes similar to the
New York enactment.-, Of the states which
I For a discussion of the evolution of the privilege
at common law, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2394
(3d ed. 1940).
C.P.A. §351: Clergymen not to disclose confessions. A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed to disclose a confession
made to him. in his professional character, in the
course of discipline, enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he belongs.
However, Section 354 of the Act permits the
person confessing to waive the provisions relating
to confidential communications.
6

Ariz. Code Ann. §23-103; Ark. Stat. §28.606;
Calif. Code Civ. Proc. §1881(3); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§153-1-7; Ga. Code Ann. §38-419.1; Idaho Code
§9-203; Ind. Stat. Ann. §2-1714; Iowa Stat.
§622.10; Kan. Gen. Stat. §60-2805(5); Ky. Rev.
Stat. §421.210(4); La. Rev. Stat. §15:477 (Crim.

have no statutory provisions relating to the
privilege, there is reported a lower court
decision in one of them, Pennsylvania,
which seems to recognize the privilege. 6 Although the Federal Rules of Procedure do
not explicitly declare such confessor-penitent communications privileged,7 the general rule, nevertheless, seems to be recognized in federal courts. 8
In April 1955, a Catholic priest turned
over to agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation $6,800 which he said was part
of $7,780 taken from a Denver bank during
a robbery. The priest said the money was
given to him by the bandit who confessed
the crime, and that "my lips are sealed.
I have a sacred obligation by which I must
abide even if it means my life." The United
States District Attorney did not reveal the
name of the priest.9
Proc.); Mich. Comp. Laws §617.61; Minn. Stat.
§595.02(3); Mo. Rev. Stat. §491.060(4); Mont.
Rev. Code §93-701-4(4); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§25-1201(4), 25-1206; Nev. Comp. Laws §8973:
N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:81-9; N. Mex. Stat. Ann.
§20-1-12(e); N. D. Rev. Code §31-0106; Ohio
Rev. Code §2317.02(B); Okla. Stat. §12-385(5);
Ore. Rev. Stat. §44.040(c); S. D. Code
§36.0101(2); Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(3); Vt.
Stat. §1740; Wash. Rev. Code §5.60.060(3); W.
Va. Code §4992(d); Wis. Stat. §325.20; Wyo.
Comp. Stat. §3-2602(2).
'In re Shaeffer's Estate, 52 Dauph. 45 (Pa. Orph.
1942).
Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 26; Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 43 (a).
S United States v. Keeney, III F. Supp. 233
(D.D.C.

1953).
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